Harris v. United States: The Supreme Court\u27s Latest Avoidance of Providing Constitutional Protection to Sentencing Factors by Hendrix, Julie L.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 93
Issue 4 Summer Article 4
Summer 2003
Harris v. United States: The Supreme Court's Latest
Avoidance of Providing Constitutional Protection
to Sentencing Factors
Julie L. Hendrix
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Julie L. Hendrix, Harris v. United States: The Supreme Court's Latest Avoidance of Providing Constitutional Protection to Sentencing
Factors, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 947 (2002-2003)
0091-4169/03/9304-0947
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 93, No. 4
Copyright 0 2003 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in US.A.
HARMS V. UNITED STATES: THE SUPREME
COURT'S LATEST AVOIDANCE OF
PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION TO SENTENCING FACTORS
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), a federal drug and
firearm statute that increases a defendant's minimum sentence by two years
based upon a determination that the defendant brandished a firearm.2 The
sharply divided Court concluded that the brandishing of a firearm under §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) is a sentencing factor to be determined by the judge, rather
than an element of a separate offense to be found by the jury.3 The Court
held that § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments,
which provide certain protections to the criminally accused . Reconciling
McMillan v. Pennsylvania5 with Apprendi v. New Jersey,6 the Court's
plurality opinion reasoned that although a jury must find facts that would
extend the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum, a judge
alone may find facts that merely increase a minimum sentence because the
jury would have already authorized the maximum sentence with its guilty
verdict.7
This Note examines several Supreme Court decisions that have defined
the respective roles of judges and juries in determining sentencing factors
and elements of a criminal offense. Interestingly enough, these prior
decisions were also sharply divided. This Note argues that although the
Court was correct in finding a distinction between McMillan and Apprendi,
I 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
3 Harris, 536 U.S. at 556.
4 Id. at 568.
477 U.S. 79 (1986).
6 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 556-68.
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the Court erred in failing to overrule McMillan and in holding that the
brandishing of a firearm is a sentencing factor to be determined by the
judge. In order to simplify the considerations that courts must make in light
of the Supreme Court precedent, the Court should have created a bright-line
rule requiring any fact (other than a prior conviction) that a statute links to a
variation in the defendant's sentence to be treated as an element of the
offense. To comply with constitutional protections, such a fact must be
charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution
provide certain protections to persons accused of a crime. The Fifth
Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law[.]" 8 The Sixth Amendment ensures that "[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed ...and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation[.]" 9
The Supreme Court has elaborated on these constitutional protections.
In Hamling v. United States,'0 the Court stated that a sufficient indictment
"contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a
defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and ... enables him
to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same
offense."' Continuing, the Court wrote that "[i]t is generally sufficient that
an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long
as 'those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any
uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute
the offence intended to be punished. ' '' 2 In In re Winship,'3 the Court held
that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
0 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
Id. at 117 (citing United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953); Hagner v. United
States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932)).
12 Id. (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
'3 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged."
14
B. EVOLUTION OF SENTENCING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
A tug-of-war between judge and jury has long existed, from the
foundation of English common law to recent cases before the Supreme
Court.' 5 As early as 1628, it was established common law that juries
determined the facts of a case, while judges determined the law.1 6 With
respect to sentencing practices, however, this distinction between the two
roles has been blurred. In the mid-nineteenth century, criminal statutes in
the United States evolved from providing fixed sentences to providing for
judicial discretion within a sentencing range. 17 Such discretion led to a
disparity in sentences among like offenders. 18  This caused many
legislatures at the end of the twentieth century to revise their criminal
statutes once more to take away some of that discretion. 9 One of the
measures used to limit judicial discretion was to assign a particular weight
to a specified fact.20 That fact, for example, could determine a defendant's
minimum or maximum sentence, or the fact could add extra years in prison
to a defendant's regular sentence. 2' The following cases document some of
the ways in which the Supreme Court has handled difficult constitutional
questions stemming from these new statutes.
1. Mandatory Minimums: McMillan v. Pennsylvania
In a 1986 case, McMillan v. Pennsylvania,22 the Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act.23 Under the Act, those who were convicted of particular
felonies received a prison sentence of at least five years if the judge found,
" Id. at 364.
15 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (stating that "competition
developed between judge and jury over the real significance of their respective roles").
16 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 155b (1628), cited in Jones,
526 U.S. at 247 n.8.




21 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (reviewing sentence enhancement
statute); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (reviewing maximum sentence
statute); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (reviewing minimum sentence
statute).
22 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
23 Id; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
20031
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by a preponderance of the evidence, that the convicted person "visibly
possessed a firearm" while committing the felony.24 At the other end of the
sentencing range, the judge could not impose a sentence that was greater
than the maximum permitted for the crime. The act also set forth that
visible possession was not an element of the crime and that notice that the
state would attempt to show visible possession was not required until after a
conviction.
26
In a 5-4 decision,27 the Court held the act constitutional and rejected
the argument of four petitioners that visible possession must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt because it is an element of a "new set of
upgraded felonies., 28 The Court noted its basic rejection of the idea "that
whenever a State links the 'severity of punishment' to 'the presence or
absence of an identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a
reasonable doubt." 29 The Court for the first time referred to such facts as
"sentencing factors" 30 and distinguished them from elements, which are
"included in the definition of the offense" and must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.3' Although the Constitution limits the extent to which
states may define crimes and penalties, the act in question did not exceed
those limits. 32 Visible possession did not appear to be "a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense." 33 Rather, the act merely "ups the ante"
for defendants by limiting the sentencing judge's discretion to selecting a
sentence within the range that would have been available without the
factual finding.34
24 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
25 Id. at 82.
26 Id. at 81 n.1.
27 Id. at 79. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, and O'Connor
formed the majority in McMillan. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissented. Id.
28 Id. at 83. In their argument, the petitioners relied on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
" MeMillan, 477 U.S. at 84 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977)).
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the majority misinterpreted Patterson because that
case actually said the state did not have to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the
existence or nonexistence of which it was willing to recognize as an exculpatory or
mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the
punishment." See id. at 98-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson. 432 U.S. at 207)
(emphasis added).
30 See id. at 85-86; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (2000).
"' McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).
32 See id. at 86-91.
13 Id. at 88.
34 Id. at 87-88.
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that visible possession is an
element to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt "[b]ecause the [act]
describes conduct that the Pennsylvania Legislature obviously intended to
prohibit, and because it mandates lengthy incarceration for the same. 35
Justice Stevens asserted that "a State may not advance the objectives of its
criminal laws at the expense of the accurate factfinding owed to the
criminally accused who suffer the risk of nonpersuasion." 36
Justice Marshall's dissent, largely in agreement with Justice Stevens, 3
asserted that the majority gave too much deference to the Pennsylvania
legislature's statement that visible possession is not an element. 3' The
Winship decision requires that the prosecution prove visible possession
beyond a reasonable doubt.39
2. An Element in Disguise: Jones v. United States
In a 1999 case, Jones v. United States,40 the Supreme Court determined
that what superficially appeared to be sentencing factors in a particular
4'federal offense were actually elements of the crime. Jones involved a
federal carjacking statute consisting of a main paragraph containing
elements of the offense, followed by three clauses establishing maximum
sentences.42 The first clause set the maximum sentence for the offense at
fifteen years; the second clause stipulated a twenty-five-year maximum
sentence upon the finding of "serious bodily injury," and the third clause
35 Id. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens then explained this assertion in
broader terms, arguing that the Due Process Clause requires a state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt "any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a
special stigma and a special punishment." Id.
36 Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in this
dissent. Id.
38 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
41 See id.
42 See id. at 230. The statute read:
Whoever, possessing a firearm ... takes a motor vehicle ... from the person or presence of
another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988).
2003]
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stipulated a maximum sentence of life imprisonment upon a finding that
death resulted from the offense.43 As such, the statute in question either
defined three different offenses or one offense with three possible
maximum sentences, two of which turn on sentencing factors. 4
In another 5-4 decision,45 the Court held that the statute defined three
distinct offenses and that the facts on which the sentences were conditioned
are considered elements, not sentencing factors.46 Yet, despite this holding,
the Court adhered to its past rejection of the notion that "every fact with a
bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury."47 The Court explained its
reasoning as follows. First, although the "look" of the statute suggests that
serious bodily injury and death are sentencing factors, the substantial
penalties attached to them imply otherwise.48 Second, Congress seems to
have intended serious bodily injury (the fact relevant to the crime at issue in
Jones) to be an element of this offense. 49 Although serious bodily injury is
used both as a sentencing factor and an element in other federal statutes, in
the context of robbery, it is traditionally treated as an element.5° Model
statutes used by Congress in drafting the statute, as well as state statutes,
also suggest serious bodily injury is an element. 51 Lastly, the Court should
apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, interpreting the statute in a
way that avoids raising constitutional issues.
52
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Jones asserted that the statute at issue
defined one offense. 53 He explained that the majority erred not only in its
interpretation of statutory construction,54 but also in its decision to rely on
the constitutional avoidance doctrine.55
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
44 Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
45 Id. at 227. Justices Souter, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg formed the
majority, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Breyer
dissented. Id.
46 See id. at 229.
17 Id. at 248.
41 Id. at 233.
49 See id. at 235.
50 Id. Carjacking is a form of robbery. Id.
51 See id. at 235-37.
52 Id. at 239. ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions
are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General
v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909))).
53 Jones, 526 U.S. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Breyer joined in this dissent. Id.
54 See id. at 254-64.
15 Id. at 254, 264-71.
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3. Sentence Enhancement: Apprendi v. New Jersey
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey.56
Apprendi questioned the constitutionality of a New Jersey hate crime law
that authorized a trial judge to "enhance" the sentence of any defendant
convicted of a second-degree offense to between ten and twenty years'
imprisonment, if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant committed the offense "with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race[.]y 57 The defendant in
Apprendi had been convicted of a second-degree offense regularly
punishable by five to ten years' imprisonment. 58 However, the defendant
was sentenced to twelve years pursuant to the hate crime law.59 The case
questioned whether the Constitution requires a fact that would increase a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury.6 °
Like McMillan and Jones, Apprendi was decided by a 5-4 vote.6' The
Court found that the sentence-enhancing law was unconstitutional and held
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 62 The Court
endorsed a rule set forth in the concurring opinions in Jones, that "[i]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed .... [S]uch facts must be established by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt., 63 The Court explicitly did not overrule McMillan but
emphasized McMillan's limitation to "cases that do not involve the
imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the
offense established by the jury's verdict." 64
Justice O'Connor's dissent, which would have found the statute
constitutional, criticizes the majority for its "watershed change in
56 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
57 Id. at 468-69; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-7(a)(3), 44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000).
8 Id. at 468.
9 Id. at 474.
60 Id. at 469.
61 See id. at 466. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg formed the
majority in Apprendi, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Breyer dissented. Id.
62 Id. at 490.
63 Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13.
2003]
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constitutional law.",65 Rather than using a traditional "cautious approach," 66
the majority creates confusion in sentencing with its apparent holding:
"[A]ny fact that increases or alters the range of penalties to which a
defendant is exposed-which, by definition, must include increases or
alterations to either the minimum or maximum penalties-must be proved
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."67  Such a rule conflicts with
McMillan.68 Moreover, the Court's "increase in the maximum penalty" rule
is not required by the Constitution.
69
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer added that the Court's holding was
"impractical., 70  Judges, rather than juries, determine sentence-affecting
facts not out of "an ideal of procedural fairness" but out of "an
administrative need for procedural compromise." 7' There are so many facts
that could pertain to a sentence that it is not practical to submit all, or even
many, of them to the jury.72 Justice Breyer also criticized the Court's logic
for seemingly approving judicial consideration of facts that could increase a
defendant's sentence, but just not when those facts are stipulated in the
statute.73
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Joseph Harris owned and operated a pawn shop in Abermarle,
North Carolina. 74 During business hours, Harris typically carried a handgun
65 Id. at 524, 554 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer joined in this dissent. Id.
66 See id. at 525, 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in this dissent. Id.
71 Id. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
72 Id. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer explained that if such facts were
required to be submitted to the jury, the defendant might be placed in the "awkward (and
conceivably unfair) position of having to deny he committed the crime yet offer proof about
how he committed it, e.g., 'I did not sell drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams."' Id.
Although he noted that "special postverdict sentencing juries could cure this problem,"
Justice Breyer says such juries "have seemed (but for capital cases) not worth their
administrative costs." Id.
73 See id. at 561 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (No. 00-10666).
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in an unconcealed hip holster,75 which he removed each night before
leaving the shop.76
On the afternoon of April 29, 1999, an undercover law enforcement
officer visited Harris's pawn shop to purchase marijuana. 77  The agent
brought with him a confidential informant, Rodney Deaton, Harris's half
brother.78 After thirty minutes of casual conversation, a sale of one ounce
of marijuana was negotiated.79  Deaton then noticed Harris's gun and
inquired about it. 80 After further inquiries from Deaton and the officer,
Harris removed the gun from the holster.8' He stated that the gun "was an
outlawed firearm because it had a high-capacity magazine. 82 Harris also
showed them his homemade bullets, 3 which he claimed "could pierce a
police officer's armored jacket.8 4
The undercover officer returned twice more to Harris's shop during
business hours.85 The officer purchased four ounces of marijuana on April
30 and some marijuana and other drugs on May 6.86 Harris was wearing the
gun on both days, but the gun was not discussed and Harris did not remove
it from the holster.
87
B. HARRIS'S INDICTMENT, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCING
After Harris's arrest,88 a federal grand jury in the Middle District of
North Carolina returned an indictment charging him with two counts of
distribution of marijuana and two counts of carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime.89  The firearm charge was brought
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which states that a person who
75 See id. (also stating that it was lawful for Harris to do so); Brief for the United States
at 2, Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (No. 00-10666).




80 Id. It is debated whether the sale was concluding or already completed when the first
inquiry about the gun took place. See Brief for the United States at 2, Harris (No. 00-
10666); Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris (No. 00-10666).
81 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris (No. 00-10666).
82 Brief for the United States at 2, Harris (No. 00-10666).
83 id.
84 Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris (No. 00-10666).
85 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris (No. 00-10666).
86 Id. at 4.
87 id.
88 Id.
89 Id.; Brief for the United States at 3, Harris (No. 00-10666).
2003]
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"during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime, "uses or carries a
firearm" or who "possesses" a firearm "in furtherance of' such a crime, will
receive punishment in addition to that given for the drug trafficking crime. 90
The punishment, listed in the first of three clauses following the main
paragraph, is imprisonment for a minimum of five years. 9' However, if the
defendant "brandished" the firearm, the second clause mandates
imprisonment for a minimum of seven years, and if the defendant
"discharged" the firearm, the third clause mandates imprisonment for a
minimum of ten years.92 Notably, Harris's indictment did not charge him
with having brandished a firearm, "nor did it charge him with any crime
pertaining to the events of April 29." 93
The prosecution dropped one of the two counts of distribution, and
Harris pleaded guilty to the other.94  The prosecution also dropped one
count of the firearm charge. 95 On the remaining count, carrying a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime on April 30,96 Harris waived his right to
a jury and went to a bench trial.97 The judge found Harris guilty pursuant to
§ 924(c)(1)(A). 98
For the distribution count, the pre-sentence report recommended zero
to six months of imprisonment, calculated according to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.99 For the firearm count, the Sentencing Guidelines
9' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The statute states:
Any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime...
uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime-
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7
years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10
years.
Id.
9" Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
92 Id. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii)-(iii).
93 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
94 See id.; Brief for the United States at 3, Harris (No. 00-10666).
95 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 3,
Harris (No. 00-10666).
96 See United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 807 (4th Cir. 2001).
97 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 3,
Harris (No. 00-10666).
98 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 3,
Harris (No. 00-10666).
99 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 3,
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required "the minimum tern of imprisonment required by statute."' 00
Under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), five years is the minimum sentence for one who
"uses or carries" a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking
crime, or who "possesses" a firearm "in furtherance of' such crime.' 10
However, the pre-sentence report, without explanation, 0 2 suggested a
minimum sentence of seven years pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which
provides for a minimum sentence of seven years "if the firearm is
brandished."'
0 3
Harris disputed the report's recommendation of a seven-year sentence,
arguing instead for a five-year sentence.°10 4 Harris argued that as a matter of
statutory construction, brandishing is an element of a separate offense
which must be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. 05 The district court rejected this claim.10 6
Harris also argued that he had not in fact brandished the firearm within
the meaning of § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). 10 7 "Brandish" is defined by § 924(c)(4)
as "with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or
otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another person, in
order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the firearm is directly
visible to that person."' 0 8 Harris contended that he had not displayed the
gun "in order to intimidate" another person.'
0 9
In considering whether Harris brandished the firearm, the district court
judge stated that it was a "close case"" 0 and that "the only thing that
happened here is [Harris] had the gun during the drug transaction."'' The
judge remarked that the definition of brandishing includes "carrying an
exposed weapon during the drug transaction."' 12  The judge found that
Harris (No. 00-10666).
10o Brief for the United States at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
'0' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
102 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
'03 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); Brief for Petitioner at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666);
Brief for the United States at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
104 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 4,
Harris (No. 00-10666).
105 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 4,
Harris (No. 00-10666).
106 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
107 Id.; Brief for the United States at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4)(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
109 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
''o Id. ("close case"); Brief for the United States at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666) ("close
question").
111 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
112 Brief for the United States at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
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Harris had worn the gun in order "to intimidate people.., during his illegal
business" and that "a sentence of seven years is appropriate" upon
"considering all the aspects of this case." 113 In support of his decision, the
judge cited Harris's comments about the gun's ammunition," 4 despite the
judge's prior commitment not to consider the "conversation about the
gun... and the bullets" because the comments were made in answer to
questions from Deaton and the undercover officer."15  Finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that Harris brandished the firearm, the judge
sentenced Harris to seven years of imprisonment on the firearm count." 6
Harris received a two-day sentence for the distribution count."17
C. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMED
Harris appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. 18 Harris argued to the panel that brandishing is an
element of a separate offense for which he was not indicted or tried and, in
the alternative, if brandishing is a sentencing factor, then § 924(c)(1)(A) is
unconstitutional under Apprendi."9  The Fourth Circuit rejected both
arguments,12 explaining, "While the Supreme Court may certainly overrule
McMillan in the future and apply Apprendi to any factor that increases the
minimum sentence or 'range' of punishment, rather than only the maximum
punishment, that is not our role. ' 'i 2l
D. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI
Harris filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court. The Court granted certiorari on the question: "Given that a finding
of 'brandishing,' as used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), results in an
increased mandatory minimum sentence, must the fact of 'brandishing' be
alleged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?"'' 22
113 Brief for the United States at 4-5, Harris (No. 00-10666). This brief also notes,
"[a]lthough the court declined to say defir,'tively that it would reimpose that [seven-year]
sentence if petitioner's arguments on brandishing succeeded on appeal, the court made it
clear that it might do so." Id. at 5.
114 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
115 Id.; Brief for the United States at 4, Harris (No. 00-10666).
116 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
117 id.
118 United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2001).
19 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 551-52; United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 808-09 (4th
Cir. 2001).
121 Harris, 243 F.3d at 808-09.
121 Id. at 809 (citation omitted).
122 Harris v. United States, 534 U.S. 1064 (2001).
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
The constitutional question in Harris was decided by a 5-4 split among
the Justices.1 23 Justice Kennedy authored the four-part opinion, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyer joined
as to Parts I, 11, and IV. 124  Of those five Justices, only Justice Breyer
abstained from joining in Part 111.125 Justices Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg dissented.1
26
A. THE OPINION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision.127 The
Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense, in which
brandishing and discharging are sentencing factors not required to be
alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 28 Moving on to what it characterized as the main issue,
"whether McMillan stands after Apprendi,"'129 the Court reaffirmed
McMillan.)30 The Court then held § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) constitutional in light
of the McMillan opinion.131
1. Brandishing is a Sentencing Factor
In determining whether brandishing in § 924(c)(1)(A) was a
sentencing factor or an element of a separate offense, the Court first
examined the structure of the statute.' 32 Federal statutes "usually list all
offense elements 'in a single sentence' and separate the sentencing factors
'into subsections."",13 3 In § 924(c)(1)(A), the word "shall" at the end of the
main paragraph separates the elements of the offense from the sentencing
factors. 134 Subsection (i) is a "catchall minimum," while subsections (ii)
and (iii) increase the minimum based on the presence of certain facts.135




127 Id. at 568-69.
121 Id. at 556, 568.
129 Id. at 550.
30 Id. at 568.
31 Id.
132 Id. at 552-53.
133 Id. at 552 (quoting Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000)).
134 Id.; see Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 233 (1999).
135 Harris, 536 U.S. at 552-53.
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Thus, the structure of the statute suggests that brandishing is a sentencing
factor. 1
36
The Court next examined traditional use and past congressional
practice, which were the clues in Jones, to ensure that what appeared to be
sentencing factors were not meant to be elements.' 37 The Court found no
tradition of using brandishing and discharging as elements of an offense in
federal law.' 38  In fact, in Castillo v. United States,'39 the Court had
mentioned brandishing as a "paradigmatic sentencing factor."'' 40 Moreover,
the Sentencing Guidelines use brandishing and discharging to "affect the
sentences for numerous federal crimes."' 41 Of all the federal provisions that
define offenses, only § 924(c)(1)(A) mentions brandishing. 142 The Court
concluded from these observations that Congress intended brandishing and
discharging to function as sentencing factors. 143
In addition, the Court found that brandishing and discharging actually
function as sentencing factors. 4 4  Unlike the terms in Jones, which
authorized "steeply higher penalties" and thus were unlikely to be left up to
the court, 145 the factors in § 924(c)(1)(A) "constrain, rather than extend" the
judge's discretion.' 46  This effect on a defendant's sentence is more in
accord with "traditional understandings about how sentencing factors
operate."1
47
The Court also considered the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 48
This doctrine dictates that if a statute may be interpreted in multiple ways, a
court should adopt whichever approach avoids raising constitutional
questions. 149 Harris had argued that the Court should consider brandishing
136 id.
131 Id. at 553.
138 id.
13' 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
140 Harris, 536 U.S. at 553 (citing Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 126 (2000),
which states, "Traditional sentencing factors often involve ... special features of the manner
in which a basic crime was carried out (e.g., that the defendant ... brandished a gun).").
t' Harris, 536 U.S. at 553 (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2A2.2(b)(2),
2B3.1 (b)(2), 2B3.2(b)(3)(A), 2E2. I(b)(1), 2L 1.1 (b)(4) (2001)).
142 Id. at 554.
143 id.
144 id.




41 id. at 554-56.
149 Id. at 555 (citing United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)); see supra note 52.
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as an element in order to avoid deciding whether the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections apply to facts increasing the minimum sentence.
1 50
The Court refused to do so, stating that because McMillan was in place
when Congress enacted § 924(c)(1)(A), the statute had to be read in the
context of McMillan or else "the text might mean one thing when enacted
yet another if the prevailing view of the Constitution later changed."'' The
Court concluded that § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense, with
brandishing and discharging as sentencing factors to be determined by the
judge. '5 2
2. The Statute is Constitutional
The Court reaffirmed MeMillan as sound authority and held §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) constitutional.' 53 Five Justices agreed that "[b]asing a 2-
year increase in the defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of
brandishing does not evade the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments."'' 54  Consequently, the fact of brandishing "need not be
alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 55
Only four Justices, however, agreed on why the statute is
constitutional in light of McMillan and Apprendi.156 Rejecting Harris's
argument that Apprendi cannot be reconciled with McMillan,' 57 the
plurality found a "fundamental distinction" between facts that increase a
minimum sentence and facts that extend a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum. 5 8 Apprendi required facts extending a sentence beyond the
maximum authorized by the jury to be treated as elements.159 McMillan
recognized that facts increasing the mandatory minimum but not beyond the
statutory maximum may be determined by a judge because the jury with its
verdict, "authorized the judge to impose the minimum with or without the
finding."'1 6
0
150 Harris, 536 U.S. at 555.
' Id. at 556.
152 Id.
' Id. at 568.
154 Id.
155 id.
156 See id. at 557-60.
151 Id. at 557.
151 Id. at 557, 566.




The Court justified its distinction first by citing historical
understandings about the judge's role in sentencing. 16  The Court
documented a shift in the mid-nineteenth century "from criminal statutes
providing fixed-term sentences to those providing judges discretion within a
permissible range."'' 62  Such judicial discretion led to disparities in the
sentences of like offenders, so in the late twentieth century, legislatures put
measures in place to reduce judicial discretion. 63 The Court reasoned from
this evolution that "[i]f the facts judges consider when exercising their
discretion within the statutory range are not elements, they do not become
as much merely because legislatures require the judge to impose a
minimum sentence when those facts are found-a sentence the judge could
have imposed absent the finding."1
64
The Court found no evidence that the Framers of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments would have considered facts that increase a minimum
sentence, without exceeding the maximum, to be elements. 165 Although it
is not clear how such facts were actually treated, they could not have been
elements, because elements were "facts legally essential to the punishment
to be inflicted."'' 66 Since Harris could receive seven years of imprisonment
with or without a finding of brandishing, that fact could not be essential to
his punishment.
67
Lastly, the Court rejected Harris's argument that because facts
increasing a mandatory minimum typically have a greater effect on the
actual sentence given to a defendant, Apprendi should apply. 68 The Court
explained that the practical effect of a factual finding cannot control the
constitutional analysis. 169 Although "[tihe Fifth and Sixth Amendments
ensure that the defendant 'will never get more punishment than he
bargained for when he did the crime,' . . . they do not promise that he will
161 See id. at 557-59.
162 Id. at 558 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
163 id.
164 Id. at 560.
165 id.
166 Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 232 (1876) (Clifford, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks and original alterations omitted)).
167 See id at 561.
161 Id. at 566.
169 id.
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receive 'anything less' than that."' 170 A fact is not an element just because it
has a dramatic effect on the defendant's sentence.
71
McMillan and Apprendi may be read together, the Court concluded, to
include any "facts setting the outer limits of a sentence" as elements of an
offense. 172  However, "[w]ithin the range authorized by the jury's
verdict... the political system may channel judicial discretion-and rely
upon judicial expertise" by permitting judges to find the facts establishing
minimum sentences. 173  The Court emphasized that adherence to this
framework is critical to maintain the validity of the many statutes and
sentences made in reliance on McMillan.
1 74
3. Comments on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
The five Justices of the majority acknowledged the failure of
mandatory minimum sentencing to take into consideration defendants'
unique circumstances that might warrant a lesser sentence. 175  Such
problems, said the Court, "would persist whether the judge or the jury
found the facts giving rise to the minimum."'176 Resolution lies not with the
Court but with "Congress, the States, and the democratic processes.
177
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer abstained from joining in the plurality's harmonization
of McMillan and Apprendi because he did not easily find a logical
distinction between Harris's case and Apprendi.178 Still disagreeing with
the holding of Apprendi, Justice Breyer explained that the Sixth
Amendment permits judges to decide sentencing factors, whether they
apply to a mandatory minimum or cause a sentence to exceed the statutory
maximum.1 79 He concurred in the judgment because "extending Apprendi
to mandatory minimums would have adverse practical, as well as legal,
170 Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 567.
173 id.
174 Id. at 567-68.
'7 Id. at 568.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
179 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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consequences."' 80 As a matter of policy, however, Justice Breyer does not




The dissenting Justices argued that the Court should have reaffirmed
Apprendi, overruled McMillan, and reversed the lower court in this case.'
According to the dissent, the plurality's "fine distinctions with regard to
vital constitutional liberties cannot withstand close scrutiny.'1 83  The
principles underlying Apprendi equally apply to facts increasing a
mandatory minimum. 8 4 The dissent explained, "Whether one raises the
floor or raises the ceiling[,] it is impossible to dispute that the defendant is
exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed."'' 85 Because a
finding of brandishing exposes a defendant to a harsher range of penalties,
representing both a special stigma and a special punishment, as a
constitutional matter that fact must be deemed an element. 8 6 The dissent
cited actual sentencing practices as support that these factual findings result
in harsher penalties.187  Nearly all defendants sentenced under §
924(c)(1)(A) received the mandatory minimum of five, seven, or ten years
depending on whether the defendant carried, brandished, or discharged a
firearm. 1
88
The dissent criticized the plurality for allowing Apprendi to be avoided
with clever statutory drafting. 189  For example, under the plurality's
reasoning, if Congress clearly intended brandishing to be a sentencing
factor and had instead attached to it a mandatory minimum of life
imprisonment, that fact would not have to be charged in the indictment or
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.1'g Under the plurality's reasoning, a
factual finding of brandishing must still be left to the judge "because surely
our fundamental constitutional principles cannot alter depending on degrees
of sentencing severity.''
Io Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
"' See id. at 570-71 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
182 Id. at 572-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183 1d. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186 See id at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 484 (2000)).
187 Id. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The dissent would have overruled McMillan for its "inherently flawed"
analysis.' 92 Moreover, the underlying rule in McMillan permitting a state to
treat aggravated behavior as a sentencing factor was questioned in Jones
and limited by Apprendi, so the plurality's reliance on that principle is also
flawed. 193  Stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent, 194 fails to justify
upholding McMillan because the effect of McMillan is particularly weak in
contrast to the common law roots of the relationship between punishment
and constitutional protection. 95  Lastly, the dissent noted that Justice
Breyer's partial concurrence "leaves only a minority of the Court embracing




The Court properly determined that Apprendi did not overrule
McMillan, but the Court should not have reaffirmed McMillan and held that
brandishing pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A) need not be alleged in the
indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury. 197 In light of
the Court's heavily split decisions on this issue, the Court should have
overruled McMillan and articulated a new, clearer rule, rather than
contributing to the list of considerations that a court must make when faced
with a sentencing factor. Essentially, the Court should have done what it
has consistently refused to do: set forth a bright-line rule providing that
when an offense stipulates a change in punishment to be contingent on a
specified factual finding other than a prior conviction, that fact must be
alleged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 98 Such a rule is necessary in order to provide proper
protection to the criminally accused, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 99
192 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
'95 Harris, 536 U.S. at 582 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117 See id. at 568.
198 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977).
199 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 117 (1974); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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A. APPRENDI DID NOT OVERRULE MCMILLAN
The Court in Harris boiled the issue down to whether McMillan stands
after Apprendi,200 and the plurality reached a logical conclusion as far as the
consistency of those two cases' holdings. The holding of McMillan is not
inconsistent with that of Apprendi.z°' McMillan held that a statute that
establishes a mandatory minimum, where a judge decides the sentencing
factor, is constitutional because it merely "ups the ante" for defendants.
202
Apprendi held that enhancement of a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum, where a judge decides the fact needed for the enhancement, is
unconstitutional.2 °3 Because McMillan did not involve a situation where the
sentence could exceed the statutory maximum, it does not directly conflict
with the later holding of Apprendi.2 °4
B. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE OVERRULED MCMILLAN
Although the holdings of McMillan and Apprendi are logically
consistent, the Harris Court should have overruled McMillan. McMillan
failed to recognize that a loss of opportunity for a lower sentence warrants
constitutional protection. McMillan also failed to clarify when a sentencing
factor becomes an element, and it failed to recognize the constitutional
difference when the legislature, and not a judge, attaches punishment to a
fact. McMillan simply leaves too much power in the hands of lawmakers.
The reasoning behind McMillan is not sound, and the facts presented
in Harris illustrate the problem. Given that a judge determines the fact of
brandishing as a sentencing factor, if the judge does not find that the
defendant brandished, the defendant is subject to a minimum of five years
of imprisonment. 20 5 If the judge finds that the defendant brandished, the
defendant is subject to a minimum of seven years of imprisonment. 20 6 This
defendant, due to a judicial determination with a lower standard of proof
than that required for a jury,20 7 has just lost the opportunity to receive five
to six years of imprisonment.20 8 He must serve, at the very least, two years
200 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 550.
201 See id. at 557.
202 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88.
203 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
204 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 557, 566.
205 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
206 See id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
207 The standard of proof for a judge is the preponderance of the evidence. The standard
of proof for a jury is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81,
83; Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
208 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i)-(ii).
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in 209more in prison.  Thus, the defendant has been given a harsher penalty.1 °
It is this loss of opportunity which demands constitutional protection.21
The Court in Harris seems to have no problem with this loss of
opportunity largely because the judge could have sentenced Harris to seven
years regardless of the finding,21 2 and because the firearm statute had no
maximum sentence, so the factual finding could not "increase[] the penalty
. . . beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.' '21 3 But rather than clearing
the statute, this "tough luck" assertion highlights the problem with the
holding of McMillan and with the narrow rule of Apprendi. A legislature
could have established a mandatory minimum of sixty years for brandishing
and that fact would not need to be alleged in the indictment or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt because, under the Court's current
jurisprudence, it does not exceed the statutory maximum of life
214imprisonment. Such a high mandatory minimum would then raise a
question similar to the one that arose in Jones, where the Court found that
what appeared to be a sentencing factor was really an element of the
crime.21 5 In that scenario, one would argue that with a sixty-year minimum
for brandishing, it must be an element of the offense.2 16 This argument has
merit, but it still leaves unclear the point at which the punishment becomes
so great that a sentencing factor becomes an element. Constitutionality
should not depend on a particular number of years of increase, or a
percentage of change, in a sentence.21 7 The Harris plurality even stated as
209 See id.
210 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("As a matter of common sense,
an increased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty and represents the increased
stigma society attaches to the offense. Consequently, facts that trigger an increased
mandatory minimum sentence warrant constitutional safeguards.").
211 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 117 (1974); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
212 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 560; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88; United States v. Harris,
243 F.3d 806, 811-812 (4th Cir. 2001).
213 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see Harris, 243 F.3d at 809 n.2.
214 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 578-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he constitutional
analysis adopted by the plurality would hold equally true if the mandatory minimum for a
violation of § 924(c)(1) without brandishing was five years, but the mandatory minimum
with brandishing was life imprisonment.")
215 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999).
216 See id. at 233.
217 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 578-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[S]urely our fundamental
constitutional principles cannot alter depending on degrees of sentencing severity."); Harris,
243 F.3d at 812 (stating that "the claimed forty percent increase [in Harris's sentence] is less
than the 500 percent increase in Castillo or even the sixty-six percent increase in Jones. And
regardless of the percentages, a two-year sentence enhancement is not as 'steep' as an
additional ten or twenty-five years in prison.").
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much: "That a fact affects the defendant's sentence, even dramatically so,
does not by itself make it an element., 21 8 Yet, it seems unlikely that such a
sentencing scheme would succeed in the public eye.
Another reason why the McMillan analysis fails is its faulty reliance
on judges' historical freedom to determine sentencing factors. 2'9 The Court
argued that since judges had the freedom to consider a range of facts when
choosing a sentence, there should be no difference when the legislature
attaches a certain punishment to a specified factor. 220 The Court neatly
glossed over a key occurrence in the history of the McMillan case: each of
the sentencing judges had found the statute unconstitutional and then
imposed a lesser sentence than the statute required.221 So, it appears that
even judges accustomed to considering facts in the sentencing process
might have been uncomfortable with the mandatory minimum sentencing
scheme. Perhaps this discomfort came from an understanding that although
judges consider many facts and circumstances in determining a defendant's
sentence, the constitutional analysis changes when a statute ties a particular
fact to a change in the defendant's punishment.
Finally, the Court should have overruled McMillan because it leaves
too much power with the legislature. Even Justice Breyer's dissent in
Apprendi recognized that "by leaving mandatory minimum sentences
untouched, the majority's rule [in Apprendi] simply encourages any
legislature interested in asserting control over the sentencing process to do
so by creating those minimums. That result would mean significantly less
procedural fairness, not more. 222
C. SENTENCING FACTORS REQUIRE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
As the law now stands, a judge faced with a sentencing factor must
consider the minimum and maximum sentences involved, as well as the
function, statutory construction, and traditional and congressional uses of
that sentencing factor in order to decide whether that factor should receive
the constitutional protection provided to elements.223  Instead of
contributing to this myriad of considerations, the Court should have set
forth a bright-line rule. Such a rule would require any fact, other than a
28 Harris, 536 U.S. at 566.
219 See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986).
220 See id.
221 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82.
222 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 564 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d
806 (4th Cir. 2001).
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prior224prior conviction, that a statute links to a variation in the defendant's
sentence to be treated as an element of the offense. This fact should
therefore be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 225 Sentencing factors should receive this level
of protection because it is guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
and because juries, not judges, are the proper finders of fact. Moreover, a
fact should receive consistent constitutional protection regardless of its
placement in a paragraph.
One might conclude from a plain reading of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, Hamling, and Winship, that facts statutorily connected to
sentences should receive the same constitutional protection afforded to facts
that are deemed to be elements of the crime.226 The Fifth Amendment
guarantees due process of law,227 and the Sixth Amendment requires that
defendants "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation., 228
Hamling requires indictments to "fairly inform[] a defendant of the charge
against which he must defend," and to "fully, directly, and expressly ... set
forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be
punished. 2 29 Similarly, Winship requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
being charged., 2 30 These same protections should apply to brandishing in
the Harris case. Part of the accusation against Harris was that he
brandished his firearm. 23' Furthermore, Harris specifically had to defend
himself against the brandishing allegation because that fact was linked to
224 Prior convictions are excluded from this rule because full disclosure of that fact could
prejudice a jury. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 178-92 (1997) (holding that
when the prosecution only needs to prove the fact of a prior conviction, and the defendant
concedes a prior conviction, the court cannot permit his complete judgment record to be
revealed over the defendant's objection if the details of the record could taint the jury's
consideration). "Proving status [by stipulation or admission] without telling exactly why
that status was imposed leaves no gap in the story of a defendant's subsequent criminality[.]"
Id. at 191; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (expressing the rule that "[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.")
(emphasis added).
225 See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 248; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87; Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977).
226 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. Vi; Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 117 (1974); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
227 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
228 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
221 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117.
230 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.




his punishment.232 Sentencing factors should receive the higher level of
protection afforded to elements of the offense because they directly
correspond to a defendant's punishment.233
The fundamental common law principle that juries are finders of fact,
and judges are finders of law, suggests that juries, not judges, should
determine sentencing factors. 4 Whether Harris brandished a firearm is a
question of fact, so jurors should have had the responsibility of deciding
whether Harris's use of the firearm satisfied the definition of brandishing
pursuant to § 924(c)(4).235 The sentencing judge usurped the role of the
jury by deciding the question of fact in Harris's case. 6 In order to properly
balance sentencing power between the judge and the jury, those facts that a
statute links to a defendant's sentence should be found by the jury.
Finally, even under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is usually
debatable whether a particular fact that appears to be a sentencing factor
should really be treated as an element of the offense.237 Jones found
"serious bodily injury" to be an element of the offense, even while the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines often used "serious bodily injury" as a
sentencing factor.2 38 In Harris, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a state
and a territory treated brandishing as an element of an offense, even while it
correctly placed weight on the fact that no federal statutes did.239  The
Fourth Circuit also documented the original proposed amendment which led
to the firearm statute at issue in Harris.240 The Fourth Circuit noted that in
232 See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris (No. 00-10666); Brief for the United States at 4,
Harris (No. 00-10666).
233 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117;
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
234 See COKE, supra note 16.
235 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
236 See Brief for the United States at 4-5, Harris (No. 00-10666).
237 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999).
238 See United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 810 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001).
239 See id. at 810 n.3.
240 See id. at 810-11. The amendment, as passed by the House, read:
A person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for
which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States-
(A) possesses a firearm in furtherance of the crime, shall, in addition to the sentence imposed
for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years;
(B) brandishes a firearm, shall, in addition to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years; or
(C) discharges a firearm, shall, in addition to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years[.]
H.R. 424, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998); 144 CONG. REC. H530-31, H535 (daily ed. Feb. 24,
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the final version of the statute, possession of a firearm moved up into the
main paragraph detailing the elements, but "Congress decided not to
include brandishing or discharging as actus reus elements of the offenses
proscribed in the initial principal paragraph., 241  Although the Fourth
Circuit used this to support the classification of brandishing as a sentencing
factor,242 the disturbing point remains that the same fact could receive very
different constitutional protection based on its final placement in a
paragraph. Because the line between sentencing factors and elements is so
easily crossed, the constitutional protection provided to sentencing factors
and elements should be identical.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Harris v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed McMillan v.
Pennsylvania and held 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) constitutional.243 The
Court decided that § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense with multiple
sentencing factors.244 Whether a defendant "brandished" a firearm is a
sentencing factor to be determined by a judge and is not required to be
alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.245 In a plurality opinion, the Court reasoned, among
other things, that the sentencing judge had the power to sentence the
defendant to seven years with or without a finding of brandishing.246
The Court was correct in maintaining a distinction between McMillan
and Apprendi. However, the Court should have overruled McMillan in
favor of a new rule stating that any fact, other than a prior conviction, which
a statute links to a change in the defendant's sentence, must be afforded the
constitutional protections provided to elements of an offense. Like
elements, sentencing factors should be alleged in the indictment and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury.
Julie L. Hendrix
1998) (passing the bill in the House).
241 See Harris, 243 F.3d at 811.
242 See id.
243 Harris, 536 U.S. at 569.
244 Id. at 557.
245 Id.
246 See id. at 561.
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